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On the Adequacy or Inadequacy of Keynesian
Balance—of--Payments Theory: A Rejoinder
Abstract
This note again refutes Kuska's proposition that equality between the
demandfor and supply of money ("money market equilibrium') implies equilibrium
in the balance of payments.Indeed, under a regime of fixed exchange rates it
is precisely the balance of payments deficit or surplus that equilibrates the
money market. The refutation of Kuska's proposition does not require any
special assumptions about sterilisation policies,it is also established,
again contrary to Kuska, that in a two country world with a fixed exchange rate,
internationally mobile capital and endogenous interest rates, only one country
can independently achieve a money supply target.
Failure to distinguish between the change in the money stock and domestic
credit expansion appears to be the source of Kuska's erroneous indictment of
"Keynesian" balance—of—payments theory.We also establish the conditions
under which alternative (ex-ante) balance of payments definitions can be
substituted for an asset market equilibrium condition.
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In a recent issue of this Review (September 1982) Edward A. Kuska has
replied to comments by Alan V. Deardorff, Norman C. Miller and us (this
Review, September 1981) on his article 'On the Almost Total Inadequacy of
Keynesian Balance—of-Payments Theory", published by this Review in September
1978. In his original paper Kuska set forth four Propositions indicting a
large number of balance-of—payments models (which he chose to call "Keynesian")
as being "inadequate" or inconsistent.
His Proposition 1 stated that omission of wealth in asset demand functions
can have potentially bizarre implications for the implicit specification of
"suppressed" asset demand functions. Along with our fellow commentators we
agreed with this proposition, pointing out that it is well-known and has been
reflected in macroeconomic models for some time without affecting their
essential features or implications for policy in a fundamental way. No more
need be said about this.
Kuska's Propositions 2 and 3 are the source of the controversy. Proposition
2 states that "Models which bring each country's demand and supply of money into
equality have zero overall balance—of-payments figures in all periods. This is
true whether the supplies of money are taken to be endogenous or exogenous. If
in addition, the model includes other equations which allow the overall balance-
of-payments to be non-zero, it is contradictory" (p.664). In Proposition 3 he
states that "Models in which more than one market—clearing equation is suppressed
do not require equilibrium in any of the excluded markets" (p.664).1 Our cormient
demonstrated that Proposition 2 is based on an erroneous concept of equilibrium
in which beginnning-of-period asset supplies are equated to end-of—period demands.
* LondonSchool of Economics and National Bureau of Economic Research and
Yale University and National Bureau of Economic Research, respectively.
1 Proposition 4 is a corollary of Proposition 2.-2-
Proposition 3 we showed was false for the case in which bonds are internationally
immobile (the one Kuska considered) but true if they are mobile between countries.
We also pointed out that an implication of a proper specification is that, when
bonds are internationally mobile, only one country can control or independently
target its money supply.
In his reply Kuska attempts to resurrect his Proposition 2 and 3, arguing
that they fail to obtain only when "simultaneous sterilisation" (which he
asserts is an "empirically false assumption") takes place. In addition,
concerning the endogeneity of one national money supply in a two-country fixed
exchange rate world, he claims that "Buiter and Eaton made a slip in their
analysis, for it transpires that both money market equations are redundant in
the general model' (p.888).
I.On confusing changes in the money supply with domestic credit expansion
In fact, Kuska's two propositions are false regardless of whether or not
the monetary authorities sterilise payments imbalances, as is his assertion
that in a two-country framework with traded bonds both national money
supplies are exogenous. His results follow from an error that is at the same
time elementary and fundamental:he simply confuses the change in the domestic
money stock with domestic credit expansion. As can be found in any text on
the money supply process, in an "outside" money economy, the change in the
(high—powered) money supply equals net central bank purchases of domestic
government bonds (domestic money expansion) plus the domestic currency value
of the change in international reserve holdings.1
Kuska introduces his error in his reply immediately following his equations
(15) and (16) repeated here:
BL -M- (1)
****
BL —M —M (2)
1 See, for example, Johnson's Lectures in Economics 1, (1971, p.182) quoted
below.—3—
HereB denotes the home-coutry's balance of payments, L end-of-period demand
for home—country money, M is the beginning-of-period supply of home-country
money ,and,most importantly, zM is money issued by the government to finance
its deficit, i.e., domestic credit expansion. Equivalent magnitudes for the
foreign country are denoted with asterisks. That AM constitutes only domestic
credit expansion is clear from Kuska's equations (1) and (3): AM and AM equal
government expenditure plus debt service less taxes less bond issue to the
domestic and foreign private sectors. To these he adds equation (2), which
states that AMe, "the amount of money supplied by the exchange authority in
Dreserving the value of the exchange rate" equals AR, "the change in reserves"
(p.889). Equation (4)equatesAM*etoAR*. The change in total money supplies,
*
whichwe will call AM and AM S are, of course, the sums of domestic credit
expansion and the change in reserves; i.e.
AMSAM + AMe (3)
AMS AM + AM*e (4)
Thus the end-of—period money supplies are given by N5 + AM + AR and
* * *
M+ Al + AR ,respectively.
By themselves, Kuska's equations (15) and (16) (our (1) ahd (2)) are
almost correct.Replacing M by M5 and M* by M*s would make them wholly correct.
We therefore replace (1) and (2) by
B L -M5—AM (1')
**
BL-M—AM (2')
Whatis wrong Tshis interpretation of them, that "the balance of payments of
thegovernmentand private sectors is equal- to their excess demand for money"
(p.891, emphasis added). The right-hand sides of his equations (15) and (16)
We follow Kuska in assuming that money is only held by private residents
in its country of issue. In our comment we also permitted domestic money
to be held by foreign authorities (and vice versa). The loss of reserves
for the domestic country was identified with the acquisition of domestic money
by the foreign authorities net of the acquisition of foreign money by the
domestic authorities (and conversely for the change in foreign reserves).
In Kuska's exposition (followed here) reserves are best thought of as an
"outside" asset such as gold. No substantial conclusions are affected by
this minor change in specification.—4-
(our (1) and (2)) are no such things.The end-of-period demands are L and L*;
* * *
theend-of-period supplies are M +M+tMand M +M+tM .The
correct expressions for the excess demands for money are given by the negative
of the left-hand sides of his equations (19) and (20), repeated here, again
with M and M* replaced by M5 and M5 respectively.
+M+Me-L=0 (5)
*s * e* *
M+M +M -L =0 (6)
The riaht-hand sides of Kuska's corrected equations (15) and (16) (our (1') and
(2')) give only the excess of one end-of-period money demands over beginning-
of-period supplies plus domestic credit expansions.1
l.AMoney market equilibrium and a non-zero balance-of-payments
If the right—hand sides of Kuska's corrected equations (15) and (16) (our
(1') and (2')) did in fact represent the excess demands for money then, of
course, his Proposition 2 would follow.Since the correct definitions are
provided by the negative of the left—hand sides of his amended equations (19)
and (20) (our (5) and (6)), equilibrium is perfectly compatible with
=—eLM 0.
What Kuska has failed to realise is that under a regime of fixed exchange
rates it is precisely the balance-of payments that equilibrates the money markets.
If end-of-period money demand exceeds the initial money stock by more than
domestic credit expansion in that period, then a balance—of—payments surplus
in that period provides the additional supply necessary to equilibrate end-of-
period supply and demand. Conversely if domestic credit expansion exceeds
the excess of end-of-period money demand over the beginning-of-period money
1 In this sense Kuska's reply represents a step forward from his first
publication. Instead of equating end-of-period demand to beginning-of-
period supply he now adds to the beginning-of-period supply the
within-period change from one source, domestic credit expansion. The
within—period change arisirfrom the change in in reserve holdings has
not yet gained recognition in Kuska's equilibrium conditions.—5—
stock, a balance—of-payments deficit ensues.1 This point has been made
succinctly by Johnson (1971).
'Assume a country on a fixed exchange rate system, that the
public adjusts its money holdings to the desired level (always and
instantaneously) through spending or not spending, that there is a
high degree of substitutability between the goods of this country and
those of the rest of the world, that the world price level is constant,
and money demanded is a multiple of income (Md =KY).Then the money
supply existing at any time will be the sum of the assets backing the
domestic money supply (international reserves and domestic credits
MS =R+D).The basic assumption is that the money supply must
always equal money demanded (Ms =Md).This means that through its
domestic policy the monetary authority (by operations on D, through
open market operations) does not determine the money stock. The money
stock is determined by demand. What the authority determines is the
size of the reserves, through the relation AR =B=Md-LD,.. ." (p.182
emphasis added).
Note that sterilisation (let alone exact, simultaneous sterilisation) is nowhere
required. The magnitude and duration of the balance-of—paymnts deficits that
a country can run are of course constrained by the size of its stock of reserves.
I.BThe exogeneity of money supplies
The same confusion between changes in the money supply and domestic credit
expansion lead Kuska to conclude that, in a two-country framework, both money
supplies can be exogenous or independently determined. He states that "Buiter
and Eaton concluded that ... oneof the domestic money stocks must be endogenous,
*
thatis, either AM or AM must be treated as a variable" (p.891). This
*
statementis, of course, a non-sequitur, AM and AM are exogenous variables
** *
(assuming,as does Kuska, that G, T, AA, C ,Tand AD are policy—determined
1 As John Makin has pointed out to us in discussion, if Kuska's Proposition 2
were correct a corollary would be that, in a regime of flexible exchange
rates, the exchange rate would be indeterminate. If money market
equilibrium implied a zero balance—of-payments there would be no role for
the exchange rate.-6-
and that no authority pegs interest rates), but they represent domestic credit
expansions. The changes in the money stocks are given by our equations (3)
*
and(4).The government can determine AM and AM independently, but since
e * * *
AM=AR=B=-eB=-eAR=-eAMe and sincee is fixed while B is
endogenous, it is patently obvious that both countries cannot independently
S *
determineAM and AM .Forthat to be possible B would have to be exogenous.
Our conclusion that only one country can independently determine its money
supply when B is endogenous stands. Kuska correctly lists B as an endogenous
variable. As we show in the next section B is in fact endogenous when bonds
are mobile, but not when they are non-traded.
To sumarise, Kuska confuses domestic credit expansion with changes in the
money stock, leading him to an erroneous proof of his Proposition 2 and a false
result that both money stocks are exogenous when bonds are traded.1 This
mistake represents the major logical error in Kuska's reply that demands
correction. There are, however, a number of other fallacies and misleading
claims in his reply that require correction or clarification.
II.Suppression of bond-market equilibrium conditions
Kuska does not respond to our demonstration that his Proposition 3 is
false for the case of no capital mobility, the case treated in his first article.
1 From the false result that the two money stocks are exogenous, Kuska infers
another demonstration of his Proposition 2:
'. . . ifthe money stocks are
assumed to be exogenous and the demands are equal to them, AMe and AMe in
(19) and (20) (our (5) and (6)) must equal zero. These equations with
*
(15)and (16) then force B and B to vanish, which is my Proposition 2'
(p.895, emphasis added). Here Kuska proves Proposition 2 by changing
definitions of the money stock. He shows on page 891, correctly, that
*
domesticcredit expansions (AM and AM )areexogenous. Here he incorrectly
calls these magnitudes the changes in the money stocks, thereby "proving"
that the money stocks are exogenous. On page 895 he has apparently adopted
the correct definition of the money stock, but nevertheless applies the
*
theoremthat was proven for AM and AM ,andasserts that the two money
stocks, now defined correctly, are also exogenous, which of course they are
not.-7-
He does establish Proposition 3 using a model in which bonds are traded. As we
pointed out in our comment, for this case his Proposition 3 would have been
correct. He does not qualify his result, however, for the no mobility case.
In addition he introduces a misleading and spurious distinction between
"Keynesian"and "r"lonetary—Approach" definitions of the balance—of—payments,
confusing ex ante and ex post or equilibrium notions.
Thesources of confusion can best be demonstrated by considering Kuska's
full model, restated here in a slightly more compact form:
Kuska's equations (19) through (24) amended again by substituting MS for M
*
andMfor M ,repeatedhere as equations (9) through (14), represent the
market clearing conditions for the two monies, two bonds and two outputs:1
Ms+M+MeL=O (7)
* * * * M +M +M -L =0 (8)
* * A+A+A -H-H =0 (9)
* * * D +D +D-J -J=0 (10)
*
Y - C - I - G - X + eX = 0 (11)
****** Y - C - I- G - X + eX =0 (12)
HereA and 0denote beginning-of-period suppliesof domestic and foreign bonds
* *
respectively,held by private agents in the homecountry while A and D are the
*
amountsheld by private agents abroad; H and H denote home and foreign demands
* 2 for domestic bonds while 3 and 3 are the hone and foreign demands for foreign bonds.
*
Equations(11) and (12) equate domestic and foreign incomes, V and V ,tothe
traditional components of aggregate demand. The variables Y, C, I, G, M, L,
* * ******
H,H ,A, A and Xare measured in domestic currency.V ,C,I , G , M , L
These are identical to the ones we presented in our equations (17) through
(22) except that Kuska's equations (24) and (25) (repeated here as (11)
and (12)) equate output to income while ours equated goods supplied to
goods demanded.The two conditions are related by Wairas' Law so we have
no quarrel with this change.
* *
2 It would have been better to write .A +Ainstead of LA in (9) and D +D
*
insteadof D in (10), but we merely follow Kuska's notational conventions.-8-
* * *
J,J ,D,D and X are foreign-currency-denominated.
Equations (7) through (12) are related by two aggregate national budget
constraints, Kuska's equations (7) and (8) repeated here with the ususal
amendments:








+ (L-M -M) (14)




An important point is that equations (7) through (15) completely describe
a general equilibrium system without any reference to the balance of payments.
A definition of the balance of payments in terms of magnitudes determined by
this system can be appended, but it is not necessary for solving it. If
formulated appropriately a balance-of-payments definition can be interpreted
as an equilibrium condition to replace any one of equilibrium conditions (7)
through (14).
II.AThe redundancy of one equilibrium condition : traded bonds
Assume that (7) and (11) and (8) and (12) obtain. Then (13) becomes:





1 They are derived by combining the government and private sector constraints
for each country, given by equations (9) and (12) and (10) and (14) of our
comment.-9—
Multiplying(17) by e and adding it to (16) gives
* * * *
0A (H+H -A -A -AA)+ePD (J +J -D-D-AD)
e *e +AM + eAM (18)
Equations (18) and (15) thus do not imply that bnth bond markets are in
equilibrium.Excess demand in one can be offset by excess supply in the
other. Requiring that one bond market be in equilibrium as well as both
money markets and both goods markets does, however, insure equilibrium in
all markets. One and only one bond market can be suppressed. Any five
of conditions (7) through (12) are sufficient to determine the endogenous
variables Y, y PD, and AMe. Kuska is thus correct in treating AMe
as an endogenous variable when bonds are traded. A consequence, as we have
S *
shown,is that AM or AMis also endogenous.
II.BThe redundancy of two equilibrium conditionsnon—traded bonds
** Ifbonds are not internationally mobile J D H A 0. Equations
(16) and (17) reduce to
X -eX A (H -A-AA)+AMe (19)
X-eX a D - D*-AD)+AMe (20)




AM a X-eX (22)
hold identically.Therefore (19) and (21) imply domestic bond market
equilibrium while (20) and (22) imply foreign bond market equilibrium. Both
bond market equilibrium conditions are redundant. Thus any four of conditions
(7) through (12) are sufficient to describe equilibrium. In this case one of
A'D and AMe is exogenous.Both countries can independently determine
AM and AMwhen bonds are not traded.-10-
II.C On"Keynesian" and 'monetary-approach' balance-of-payments definitions
Kuska accuses our fellow commentators and us of attempting 'to utilise
a balance-of—payments equation to make the system determinate" (p.887).
This is false. In our comment, as above, we make no use of the balance—of-
payments equation as an equilibrium condition to determine equilibrium. The
balance-of-payments can be inferred from equilibrium in the money, bonds and
goods markets and the budget constraints.Wairas' Law does, however, permit
replacing one equilibrium condition with a linear combination of that condition
andothers.Thus replacing one bond market equilibrium condition with a
condition that equates the change in reserves to an expression for the balance-
of—paymentsthat is derived using that bond market equilibrium condition is a
valid procedure.
Kuska provides two sets of definitions of the balance-of-payments. The
first set, which he calls the "monetary-approach" definitions, is given in his
equations (11) and (12), repeated here:
B -C-I-G+eD-A]+A(A +A-H)+eP
(D -J) (23)
B* -- I*G*+eA* - (D+D- J)
+ePA(A-H) (24)
The second set, which he calls the "Keynesian" definitions,are given in his
equations(13) and (14) repeated here:
B' - eX* + eD - A]+A (H - A*) - ePD (D - 3) (25)
B - e*X + A*/e - DJ + PD(J -D) - ePA (H* - A*) (26)
* *
SubstitutingB and Bfrom (23) and (24) for R and R in the budget
constraints (7) and (8) yields
BAR +(L-MS-AM-1e) (27)
* * ** * *
BAR +(L -M -AM -AM ) (28)—11—
e * * *
SinceB =AR=AMand B =AR=AMequations (27) and (28) imply:
AMe=LMs.AM (29)
* ** *
AM=L -M -AM (30)
which are the conditions for equilibrium in the money market. Thus the
so—called "monetary-approach' definitions apply if and only if the money market
is in equilibrium. If the money market is in disequilibrium so that end-of—
periodmoney stocks do not equal L,then Kuska's "monetary—approach" definitions
donothold. It is not correct, as Kuska asserts, that "Even in this situation
where not all markets clear in an equilibrium sense, the budget constraints and
the monetary-approach definitions, and therefore equations (15) and (16), (our
equations (1') and (2')) must hold for any actual trading which takes place"
(p.895, footnote 10, emphasis in the original).
Since Kuska's "monetary-approach" definitions of the balance-of-payments
are equivalent to money market equilibrium conditions, they cannot be substituted
as equilibrium conditions for either the bond market or goods market equilibrium
conditions. On the other hand, combining what Kuska calls the "Keynesian"
definitions, (25) and (26), with the budget constraints (7) and (8), yields
Y -C - I-G - x +eX A (H +H-A-A-) +
+(LMsAMAMe) (31)




These are linear combinations of money, bond and goods market equilibrium
conditions. The so—called "Keynesian" definitions of the balance-of—payments,
then, can be substituted as equilibrium conditions for any one of the money,
bonds or goods market equilibrium conditions.Thus suppressing two bond market
eouilibrium conditions even when bonds are traded is a valid procedure if the
appropriate balance—of—payments "equilibrium" condition such as our (25) and (26)
is introduced.—12—
As defined, Kuska's "Keynesian' definitions hold ifandonly if all three
markets are in equilibrium.Their correctness therefore requires more markets
to be in equilibrium than Kuska's "monetary-approach" definitions. However,
neither set of definitions holds in general ex ante or out of equilibrium.' If
one restricts the analysis to equilibrium positions only, all the definitions
are equivalent.
III. On the "flow" specification of capital movements
On page 893 Kuska shifts ground in his attack on "Keynesian" balance—of—
payments models, resurrecting the now very familiar issue of the "flow"
specification of capital movements: "Indeed, the balance—of—payments definitions
used in the literature are invariably different from those called Keynesian here,
being generally written as variants of:
B" =X-eX*+eD-A*+F(r -r*) [(33)]
B' =[x*
-X/e+A*/e-Dj - e*F(r -r)'(p.893). [(34)]
(Ourequations (33) and (34) appear as equations (31) and (32) in Kuska).
Kuskas criticism of this specification is more justified than the rest





(D -J)=F(r -r), (35)
a rather unlikely functional form since beginning—of-period stocks do not
affectthe within-period movement of capital.
Incriticising this specification Kuska takes a position held by most
balance-of-paymentseconomists, "Keynesian' or otherwise, for well over a
decade.Since the criticism by William H. Branson (1970),specificationof
internationalcapital movements in terms of asset market equilibrium has become
standard. (See also, Branson (l976a, l976b), Turriovsky (1976), Dornbusch (1977),
1 Kuska's confusion on this point relates to the general issue of the
applicability of Walras' Law ex ante in equilibrium and ex post. Since
a complete discussion would take us somewhat far afield the interested
readeris referred to Buiter (1980).—13—
Allen and Kenen (1980) and Whitman (1970)). The only models that we know of
from the past decade that employ (33) and (34) are those by Frenkel and
Rodriguez (1982) and Dornbusch and Frenkel (1982). If criticising the
"Keynesian" models for using a flow specification of capital movements is to
become the major thrust of Kuska's attack, he is only just joining the rest of
the profession.
IV. Conclusion
Kuska's first paper and his reply both fall into the unhappy category of
"What's right is not new and what's new is not right". Right but not new are
(1) the recognition that wealth should, in general, be an argument in asset
demand functions; (2) the proposition that, in general (but not in the model
without capital mobility analysed in Kuska (1978)), 4alras' Law permits the
suppression of only one equilibrium condition; and (3) the familiar criticism
of the "flow" specification of capital movements. New but not right are the
following: (1) the proposition that (in a two—country, fixed exchange rate
world) equilibrium between money demand and money supply in both countries
implies balance—of-payments equilibrium. Kuskas Proposition 2 is false
regardless of whether "the monetary authorities are able to sterilise exactly
and simultaneousli all balance-of-payments flows" (Kuska (1982, p.887) italics
intheoriginal). (2) The proposition that in a two-country world with a
fixed exchange rate, given public spending, taxation, and borrowing, both
countries' authorities can choose their money supplies independently.
It is important to note that this whole unfortunate debate concerns
matters of logic, not of doctrine. Those propositions of Kuska's that we have
demonstrated to be false are so regardless of whether one chooses to think of
oneself as a Keynesian, a monetarist, a Marxist or a Follower of the Line of the
Imam. Kuska's attempt to convert an issue of logic into a "Keynesian" (or
generally inadequate) versus monetary-approach (or adequate) dispute merely-14-
obscures the real issue. The source of the logical error in his reply is
fundamental and straightforward: he confuses changes in the stock of money
with domestic credit expansion. In fact, when domestic credit expansion
does not equal the difference between end-of-period money demand and the
initial money stock,1 it is the change in reserves created by a non-zero
payments balance that creates the change in the money stock required to
maintain money market equilibrium. This is the fundamental insight of the
monetary approach to the balance of payments.
If there is monetary equilibrium in successive periods, this equals the
change in money demand.—15—
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